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In Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration, David Miller defends the ability of states to
control their borders and exercise the right to exclude immigrants on the basis of community goals and preferences.
Alex Sager argues that the book’s central argument regarding this ‘weak cosmopolitan’ position is largely founded
on myth, omission and the misrepresentation of empirical evidence; thus, while it may support the convictions of
many, it also serves to reinforce misapprehension about this timely yet controversial topic. 
Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration. David Miller. Harvard University Press.
2016.
Find this book: 
A central dogma of mainstream political rhetoric (though
not practice) is that sovereign states have the right to
welcome or exclude immigrants more or less at their
discretion. Despite this, a majority of political philosophers,
including major figures such as Joseph Carens, Phillip
Cole and Chandran Kukathas, hold that current migration
regimes are deeply unjust. It is surprisingly hard to provide
a moral justification for militarised borders and detention
centres erected to exclude peaceful people fleeing
violence and seeking opportunities. Moreover, migration
controls perpetuate global inequalities. Not only are
individuals’ economic opportunities largely defined by their
place of birth, but the liberalisation of border controls would
also provide a major boost to the world economy.
David Miller is one of the most influential and articulate
defenders of broad state rights to exclude immigrants
according to community goals and preferences. Strangers
in Our Midst is a continuation of his earlier work on liberal
nationalism, developing its implications for a political
philosophy of immigration.  He endorses ‘weak
cosmopolitanism’ in which states’ obligations are limited to
respecting non-citizens’ human rights (understood as
opportunities to meet one’s basic needs) (37). This entails
an obligation to do one’s fair share to protect refugees, a
conviction shared by many publics. Miller qualifies this
obligation so that if the number of refugees accepted
‘would transform their own cultures and political institutions’
(163), then the obligation to provide asylum becomes a
humanitarian one that can be rejected.
Miller also insists that states take seriously non-citizens’ interests (37) and provide them with reasons for their
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exclusion that are tied to legitimate goals. Valid reasons for rejecting potential immigrants include the cost of
integrating immigrants with different languages, religions or lifestyles (107); the desire to protect national cultures
and avoid multicultural policies (108); the goal of curbing the size of the population and forcing other states to do the
same; and limiting greenhouse gas emissions by preventing potential immigrants from adopting Western lifestyles
(66). In most cases, states can reject would-be immigrants who are not suffering from human rights violations.
Miller considers his book to be a ‘political approach to immigration’ that focuses on institutions and policies rather
than on individual behaviour, and which ‘gives greater weight to the evidence about immigration, trust, and support
for welfare’ (18) than purely ethical approaches that refuse to consider barriers to a more generous immigration
policy. This approach has much going for it. Unfortunately, Strangers in Our Midst’s normative arguments are built
on popular myths, error and the misrepresentation of evidence through omission and selective use of the empirical
literature.
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Some of Miller’s misrepresentations are minor, such as his uncritical repetition of the Daily Mail’s myth that Eastern
European immigrants have been poaching the Queen’s swans along the River Nene (152). (Miller cites a 2010
iteration of this story that more or less repeats a 2003 story in The Sun that has been widely debunked.) More
seriously, Miller insists in the body of the text that ‘most irregular migrants will have arrived in contravention of its
immigration laws’ (117). This is false: most irregular migrants in the UK have entered legally and overstayed a visa.
He also repeats the myth that irregular migrants have engaged in ‘a form of queue-jumping with respect to all those
who are attempting to enter through legal channels’ (117). For most irregular migrants, there is no queue they are
permitted to join. He also asserts that the Daily Telegraph’s irresponsible attribution of a £120 billion cost from
immigrants outside of Europe can be substantiated (207f3). In a discussion of what he dubs the ‘pro-immigrant side,
pro-open-borders side’, Miller finds ‘liberal idealists’ but also ‘business leaders, for whom immigrants are a welcome
addition to the ranks of what Marxists used to call ‘‘the reserve army of the unemployed,’’ helping to push down
wages to the minimum’ (153). Again, this assertion about depressed wages is not supported by the evidence on the
economic effects of migration.
Many of Miller’s errors are due to his uncritical acceptance of claims made in developmental economist Paul
Collier’s controversial book Exodus. (Migration scholars such as Dilip Ratha and Michael Clemens and Justin
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Sandefur have sharply rejected the cogency of many of Collier’s claims.) Miller inaccurately cites Collier’s ‘study’ (in
fact, a hypothetical example based on a simple economic model), which suggests that ‘as the size of the
(unassimilated) diaspora grows, its pulling power increases, and the rate of immigration will tend to increase
indefinitely if there are no effective controls’ (3). This claim resonates with populist fears of ‘hoards’ of migrants
‘swamping’ wealthy states. Against Collier’s simple (arguably simplistic) model, researchers who incorporate data in
their studies have observed a ‘migration hump’ in which migration accelerates in the early phases of economic
development, but eventually declines.
Miller also follows Collier in exaggerating the evidence for ‘brain drain’ (the emigration of skilled workers), writing that
‘an unrestricted right to immigrate would make things worse because it would no longer be permissible for rich
states to close their borders to professionals exiting from poor countries where their services are badly needed’ (53,
c.f., 95, 102). In fact, there is no evidence that closing borders to professionals would actually improve the standard
of living in poorer countries. Finally, Miller relies on Collier’s discussion of Robert Putnam’s article ‘E Pluribus Unum:
Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century‘ to support the claim that higher levels of diversity in the United
States correlate with lower levels of trust (64-65). Miller asserts that most social scientists accept Putnam’s result
even though Putnam himself carefully qualified his claims. In this case, some of Miller’s own sources, buried in the
footnotes, suggest otherwise (177f16).
The fear that immigrants undermine trust is tied to a larger perspective that informs Miller’s book, since he ‘places a
great deal of weight on social cohesion and social justice and assesses immigration policy from that perspective’
(161). Built into this is the conviction that the diversity offered by immigrants is different from the varied subgroups
that inhabit every nation-state and urban area. Miller tells us that minorities ‘may retreat into enclaves with rather
little contact with those from outside of their own community’ because of ‘linguistic or religious differences’ (68). He
worries that immigrants may bring practices such as ‘coerced marriage and punishment for apostasy’ (137), and
views them as a potential cultural threat and source of conflict (though he suggests they add ‘spice’) (64). He also
begins the chapter on integration by citing riots in communities with large immigrant populations in Oldham, Paris,
Sydney and Stockholm.
Miller’s solution to segregation is immigrant integration through education and mandatory citizenship tests rather
than structural change to give members of these communities more opportunities. It does not occur to him to discuss
how institutional or structural racism prevent immigrants from integrating. Though he insists that immigration needs
to be ‘two-way’, he does not consider measures such as combatting Islamophobia or dispelling myths propagated
by the right-wing press and politicians
Miller’s misrepresentations of the empirical literature and his own perspective support a view of immigrants as
potentially deviant, law-breaking social burdens who undermine solidarity and hurt the economic prospects of
natives. This is highly problematic, since he sees himself as committed to ‘realism in thinking about immigration’
(157). This ‘realist’ approach leads him to assert that the ‘immigration regimes of most liberal democracies are under
extreme stress’, and that political philosophers need to acknowledge ‘the anxieties, resentments, and prejudices felt
by native citizens toward many (though not all) immigrants’ (159). According to Miller, ‘societies that feel crowded
already or whose culture is threatened with erosion will be more restrictive’ (160).
The conclusion that Miller draws is that a clear immigration policy ‘accompanied by strong border controls’ is
necessary to alleviate ‘a perception of cultural threat and a sense that their home is under invasion on the part of
members of the receiving society’ (160). Politicians (and presumably political philosophers) sympathetic to
immigrants need to rein in their liberal instincts ‘to avoid alienating their working and middle-class supporters’ (160).
This assumption treats anti-immigrant prejudice as an inevitable reaction to immigration, rather than seeing attitudes
as shaped by state policies and by anti-immigrant rhetoric promoted by some politicians and journalists. It is hard to
see why a realist approach cannot also insist that prejudice (which is not confined to the working and middle
classes) should be vigorously resisted when it is based on false claims and xenophobic propaganda.
I have devoted much of this review to Miller’s empirical and ideological claims and commitments because they are
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fundamental to his philosophical arguments. Except in the case of refugees, an argument for or against exclusion
comes down to how we weigh the interests of communities that wish to restrict migration against those of potential
migrants. Miller gives great weight to communities’ interests in avoiding real and perceived economic burdens from
immigration and in promoting cultural and environmental goals. Notably, these economic, cultural and environmental
burdens are all amenable to social scientific study – if these perceived burdens turn out to be largely illusory, the
case for restriction is greatly weakened. Furthermore, his surprising decision in the book to ignore economic
arguments for free movement deprives advocates of more open borders of some of their most compelling
arguments (39).
Moreover, people who defend border controls are not simply distributing benefits and burdens by regulating
immigration flows. They are advocating the use of force to prevent people from coming, a point eloquently
developed by Arash Abizadeh, among others. Miller argues that border controls are not coercive on the grounds that
they merely prevent immigrants from doing something they would like (72-75). Even if one grants Miller’s distinction
between coercion and prevention, he admits that the means used to enforce immigration restrictions are coercive
(73). From January to August 2016, more than 3000 migrants, many of them refugees, drowned in the
Mediterranean on their way to Europe, resorting to using smugglers to make the often deadly journey. A major
reason they take these extraordinary risks is that Europe has closed off legal routes for lodging claims to asylum.
Increasingly, states are detaining immigrants, often in abusive and squalid conditions. If we wish to make a
normative argument about immigration admissions, the violence of border controls presents a strong counterweight
to some citizens’ desires to close their borders.
Despite Miller’s insistence that taking his recommendations seriously ‘would involve a significant shift in policy in the
case of countries such as the United Kingdom’ (164), he has succeeded in providing a lucid defence of the
immigration status quo for wealthy, Western states. Those who believe that current migration regimes are basically
just – in principle, if perhaps often not in practice – will welcome Strangers in Our Midst as a cogent defence of their
convictions. Sadly, it will also confirm their prejudices.
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collection The Ethics and Politics of Migration: Core Issues and Emerging Trends (Rowman & Littlefield
International) appears in October. He blogs at https://alexsager.blogspot.com/ Follow him on Twitter: @aesager.
Read more by Alex Sager.
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London School of Economics.
 
Copyright 2013 LSE Review of Books
4/4
